

FRIENDS OR FOE?

The Dynamics Between the Pancasila State and Islam in Indonesia

HANS HARMAKAPUTRA*

Abstract

This essay provides a concise picture of the relation between Islam and politics in Indonesia from historical point of view, especially in contemporary setting of post-Suharto era where the Islamist voices is getting stronger. Pancasila as the official foundation of the State is not as strong as it used to be. From the other point of view, Pancasila has lost its sacredness. The ambivalent relationship between Pancasila and Islam is hard to understand if one does not look to the origin how Pancasila became the State's ideology. Furthermore, to strengthen the analysis, the essay uses one recent example of contemporary politics, i.e., the election of Governor of Jakarta in 2012, in order to grasp how the dynamics between Islam and Pancasila is really happened in reality.

Keywords: Pancasila, Islamic state, democracy, Indonesian politics, religion and politics.

Abstrak

Tulisan ini mencoba untuk memperlihatkan secara singkat pergulatan Islam dan politik di Indonesia yang terjadi di dalam sejarah bangsa Indonesia, khususnya di masa pasca-Suharto tatkala suara dari kelompok-kelompok Islam semakin menguat. Pancasila selaku fondasi negara kini tampak tidak sekuat dulu dan mengalami desakralisasi. Dinamika relasi yang ambivalen antara Pancasila dan Islam sulit untuk dimengerti tanpa melihat kepada sejarah mula-mula bagaimana Pancasila dipilih menjadi ideologi negara.

* Graduated from Hartford Seminary with a Master of Arts degree in Islamic Studies and Christian-Muslim Relations. Currently teaching Islamic courses at Jakarta Theological Seminary.

Selain itu, untuk memperkuat analisis, tulisan ini juga menggunakan contoh dinamika politik kontemporer sebagai contoh kasus, yakni proses pemilihan gubernur Jakarta yang terjadi pada tahun 2012 silam.

Kata-kata kunci: Pancasila, negara Islam, demokrasi, politik Indonesia, agama dan politik.

Introduction

During Suharto's reign, *Pancasila* was highly regarded and nobody dared to defy it. State regulations require students to learn several subjects in school, i.e., *Pancasila* and citizenship, religion, and the Indonesian language. This curriculum begins in the first grade in elementary school, and continues until the freshman year at the undergraduate level. Even after Suharto's fall, when *Pancasila* lost its former place and sacredness, the regulation changed only a little. One question that I still clearly remember is: "Is Indonesia as a country based on one religion or is it a secular country?" The rules required us to answer: "Neither! Indonesia is a religious country, but not based on one religion, nor are we a secular one! Indonesia is a country based on *Pancasila*!"

For many years, Suharto used *Pancasila* to his own advantage. He interpreted it to justify utilizing the military as his back-up, and manipulated it for his own purpose. Nevertheless, nowadays there are still many people, regardless of their social status, economic level, educational background, religion, and so on, who try to uphold *Pancasila* as the basis for our country. No one denies that *Pancasila* has been an umbrella to guarantee that all diverse groups coexist together in peace. Indeed, the regime of Suharto's New Order might have abused it for their own interest, but *Pancasila* is the soul of the nation.

With the end of the militocracy regime in 1998, however, *Pancasila* has been challenged, especially by some Islamic groups. They urge that Islam should serve as the very basic ideology of Indonesia, replacing *Pancasila*. Their presence is still growing even now, following on a new era of freedom of speech, thought, and assembly.

This essay provides a concise picture of the relation between religions, particularly Islam, and the Indonesian state, with *Pancasila* as its foundation. The approach is chronological, looking back through the years since independence day. This analysis also notes one recent example from

the capital city, Jakarta, a case that resembles the dynamics between Islam and the state. Indonesia is a very varied country and has many complexities because of the scope of its differences, but this one case validly represents the pattern of events across many regions.

The Relation of Islam and the Indonesian State throughout History: A Middle Way?

Indonesia has the highest Muslim population in the world. However, its experiences are unique regarding both Islam and the political system. Academics often treat Islam in Indonesia as marginal, because it does not seem like Middle Eastern Islam (Azra, 2006: 232). Instead, it is called “syncretistic,” with significant influence from other religions, incorporating their values. These include Buddhism, Hinduism, and the Javanese traditional religion (*kejawen*) (Azra, 2006: 232; Demerath, 2001: 84-85). Indonesian Islam also differs from that in other places because of the dynamics in Islam itself: since the earliest period, there have been mixtures of types of Islam (Von der Mehden, 1995: 196-198; Schumann, 1995: 285-287). Unfortunately, there is no space here to elaborate on the origin of Indonesian Islam and how that history which influenced its nature.¹

As for its political system, Indonesia cannot be easily categorized as a secular or Islamic domain, at least from a Western point of view. Rather, it claims to stand in the middle ground. The assertion of *Pancasila* makes Indonesia stays in the middle as a unique religious-political entity (Azra, 2006: 228). The country is not based on one religion, i.e., Islam, but it does exclude religions from the state completely, like a secular country. Rather, Indonesia’s *Pancasila* affirms that Indonesia is founded on a monotheistic principle.

This section examines more closely the relation between Islam and the Indonesian state from a historical point of view. Events described here will enable one to acquire a broader picture of the complex relations between the two.

1. The Foundation of the Indonesian State: Debate and Consensus

The Japanese army occupied Indonesia from 1942 to 1945 as part of their strategy in World War II. Different from their colonial predecessor,

the Netherlands, the Japanese saw Islam as a potential political partner. Thus Islam gained more prominence in the Japanese occupation period.² This change is evident in three new developments in that time: the creation of an Indonesian Office for Religious Affairs; the foundation of Masyumi (*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* or Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations)—one of the most important Islamic parties in Indonesia's early history—; and the formation of Hizbullah, an Islamic youth military organization which would later on be part of the Indonesian national army (Boland, 1971: 9-13).

Japan promised Indonesia its independence, firstly on 7th September 1944, and then again more explicitly on 1st March 1945. The plan was that Indonesia would be included in Japan's commonwealth. Obviously, this movement occurred only after Japan's position in World War II had worsened. To demonstrate the promise, Japan established a group of Indonesian people with excellent reputations in the eyes of the people. They were assigned the task of preparing for Indonesian independence. This group consisted of 62 persons, so it was called "Committee 62" (Boland, 1971: 16). The members of this committee, in general, stood out for two characteristics: Nationalist and Islamist. A Nationalist group consists of people who, despite being Muslim, did not intend to put Islam in the Indonesian constitution, yet Islam still would be the major basis for the country's values. An Islamic group, conversely, wanted to build a country that resembles Islam more in its whole aspect, including the constitution.

From 29th May to 1st June 1945, the committee held a conference to decide the fundamental nature of Indonesia as a country. This convention provided the first discourse on the relation between the state and Islam. Conferees, including Sukarno, later the first president, delivered speeches concerning the issue. At this point, the concept of *Pancasila* was first announced, although there were several different drafts.³ If *Pancasila* was accepted as the fundamental nature of Indonesia, then this country would become a model for multi-religious faiths. It would be neither a secular nor an Islamic country (Boland, 1971: 23). Notably, Sukarno gave a speech supporting Pancasila as a fundamental basis, while at the same time emphasizing that if the majority of Indonesian people, who were Muslims, were willing to uphold an Islamic system or included Shari'a law in the Indonesian constitution, they could do it later via democratic elections for parliament. Similarly, other faith groups that wanted to uphold their religious values could accomplish that goal with democratic elections as well (Boland, 1971: 21-23).

After the conference, they chose nine representatives, four from the Nationalist faction and five from Islamic ones. These nine were to continue discussing the basis of the Indonesian state. The task of this small committee was to find a consensus between the Nationalist and Islamic groups (Boland, 1971: 23-24). This small committee met on 22nd June 1945. The result of this meeting is the “Jakarta Charter”, a document widely known for creating controversy about the Islam-state issue. There is nothing special about its content since it is a declaration of Indonesian independence from colonization; later on, it became the preamble of the 1945 Constitution (Boland, 1971: 25-26). It was merely seven words (in the Indonesian language) that caused the problem, which persists even now. In today’s known version, there is nothing following the statement on the first principle of *Pancasila*, “Belief in One and Only God.” But in the earliest version of the “Jakarta Charter”, the text read, “Belief in One and Only God, *with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law.*” The italics are the seven words. Even though the implication of those words was obscure, the intent of the “Jakarta Charter” originally was to achieve a compromise between Pancasila and Islamic law (Boland, 1971: 27).

At the next meeting of Committee 62, from at 10th to 16th July 1945, the “Jakarta Charter” apparently was judged not good enough. Even though a majority had chosen a republic as the form of the state, objections arose as to the “Jakarta Charter”, particularly to those seven words. It was J. Latuharhary, a Christian from Nationalist faction, who raised an objection: he questioned how the state would treat other religions, as implied in the document (Boland, 1971: 28). On the other side, some figures in the Islamic faction demanded a more explicit recognition that Indonesia would be an Islamic state. They wanted to include provisions that the President and Vice-President should be Muslim, and to erase the words “*for adherents of Islam*” so that Shari’a law would apply to all people in the Republic (Boland, 1971: 29-31). After a long debate that ended in a deadlock, one member of the Islamic factions emotionally suggested to vote in an either-or decision: either Indonesia would become an Islamic country, or all the words related to “God” and “Islam” should be removed entirely, so the country would remain secular. After this session of high-tension atmosphere, the rest of the meeting on that day, 15th July, was postponed (Boland, 1971: 32-33).

The day after, 16th July 1945, Sukarno asked the Nationalist faction to sacrifice and grant more favor to the Islamic factions, in order to achieve the most important goal of the whole country: the independence of

Indonesia. The request was to accept two conditions proposed by Islamic faction: the acceptance of the seven words of the “Jakarta Charter”—the use of Shari’a law, and an inclusion in the constitution that the President and Vice-President must be Muslims. After that, the proposed constitution was revised according to this development (Boland, 1971: 33).

Surprisingly, the consensus made on that day was never approved for inclusion in the Indonesian constitution. After Japan surrendered to the Allied Forces on 14th August, Indonesia declared its independence on 17th August and established a new committee. This one consisted of 19 members who had been members of Committee 62. Their task was to establish the important components of the new republic, including the constitution, much of which had been prepared already by Committee 62 (Boland, 1971: 34-35). However, the consensus between the two factions—the seven words and Presidential condition—was altered at the end of the day. The exact reason is still in dispute even today, and has created many controversies. One answer, which Bolland supported, is that after the consensus had been made, the committee faced the portions of Indonesia where non-Muslims made up a majority, refused to join the new republic if the constitution included the consensus. This situation is part of the huge ethnic and religious diversity across the whole Indonesian archipelago, and relates to the effort to maintain its unity. Mohammad Hatta, later elected as the first Vice-President of Indonesia, held a meeting with proponents of the Islamic faction regarding this matter, and finally they agreed with Hatta’s clause (Boland, 1971: 35-36). Here, it was the Islamic faction that made a sacrifice. Some adherents of the Islamist politic later claimed that at that time the Islamic faction was deceived by a conspiracy to prevent Islam’s inclusion in the constitution.

It is worth mentioning here that Sukarno still emphasized to the committee that this constitution was only a temporary document that could be changed later through democratic elections. This process, he thought, would most likely accommodate the voices of the majority, i.e., Islam. The conclusion from this era is stated by Boland:

Thus the new Indonesia came into being neither as an Islamic State according to orthodox Islamic conceptions, nor as a secular state which would consider religion merely a private matter. The discussions had eventually resulted in a compromise, that is to say, in the idea of a state that wanted to recognize a religious principle, and wanted to be positive about religion in general and its various manifestations, or, according to

a later slogan, a state that wanted to consider religion an indispensable contribution to “nation-building and character-building”. So the Indonesian solution was not a Constitution using Islamic terms without really accepting their Islamic content, but the acceptance of common spiritual values as expressed in the Pantjasila (*Pancasila*), with its principle of Belief in the One and Only God (*Ketuhanan Jang Maha Esa*) (Boland, 1971: 38).

2. *From Indonesian Independence to the Rise of the New Order Era*

After the Indonesian state was established with *Pancasila* as its fundamental basis, there were not any real tensions between Nationalist and Islamic factions in the next decade. This absence of conflict because arose from Indonesia’s engagement of the returning Netherland army, which attempted to re-occupy Indonesia. In the struggle their defending the independence the two factions were in unity (Boland, 1971: 40). There were two new developments in Islam during this period. First was the emergence of the Darul Islam movement in West Java in 1948, while Indonesia was in turmoil after the Netherland attacks. Its leader, Kartosuwiryo, wanted to build an Islamic country based on Islamic Shari’a and so replace the Indonesian state. Similar movements arose in other regions, and joined Kartosuwiryo’s camp before the Indonesian government wiped them out in the 1960’s (Boland, 1971: 54-75). Other Islamic factions did not support the Darul Islam, preferring to implement Islam through a democratic route. The second development in this period was the growth of Islamic parties, especially *Masyumi* and *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), as the political channels for Islamic factions that wanted to incorporate Islamic values into the Indonesian constitution more explicitly.

The first democratic general election was held in 1955 in order to elect the members of Parliament and Constituent Assembly; the latter’s main task was to compile a new constitution. The Islamic faction’s agenda could be achieved only if they won the majority of seats in this general election. Despite their former optimism, unfortunately, the Islamic faction had to bear the fact that the winning party was from the Nationalist line. *Masyumi* and NU gained only the second and third positions, while the Indonesian Communist Party was fourth. The Islamic parties gained 43,5% of the total seats, so there was no dominant power in either Parliament of the Constituent Assembly (Boland, 1971: 52; Effendy, 2003: 212). This reality initiated the long and never-ending debate in the Constituent Assembly between two different factions as each wanted to establish its

own agenda and failed to achieve consensus (Cribb, 1991). Parallel with that development Indonesia also suffered from the instability of cabinets from 1955-1959. This continuing condition became a pretext for Sukarno's decision to issue his "Presidential Edict" on 5th July 1959.

The purpose of the edict was to halt the effort of the Constituent Assembly to compile a new constitution to satisfy two opposing factions: their attempts had never succeeded. Thus, among the edict's contents are the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly and the re-affirmation of *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution (Boland, 1971: 100). This was the point when, according to Boland, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution became sacred doctrines of the state, while the Islamic factions failed to realize its agenda. The period between the announcements of the edict until the end of Sukarno's regime is called "guided democracy". Sukarno's political power prevailed against all oppositions, including the Islamic faction. In 1960 *Masyumi* was disbanded by Sukarno's regime and some of its leaders were put in prison.

There was another important development for Islam in this era. While Islamic political access had been blocked since 1955, Islam focused its energy on many other aspects of life, such as education, social improvement, and religious education (Boland, 1971: 85). Slowly the Department of Religious Affairs gained importance among the people. In the next periods of Indonesian history, this development would be a great benefit for Muslims.

3. *From the New Order to the Fall of Suharto*

When Sukarno fell from power, Suharto filled the presidential position, and so began the longest regime in Indonesian history: the New Order era. At the beginning of Suharto's regime, since Sukarno's power declined in 1965, there was optimism among Islamic groups that this new ruler might be more amenable to their agendas, including the rehabilitation of the Masyumi party and release of its leaders from prison (Boland, 1971: 145-150). However, Suharto, who was backed by the military, continued his predecessor's anti-Islam policy (Demerath, 2001: 86; Effendy, 2003: 206). Islam was not the only victim of Suharto's repressive policy: C.W. Watson observes that Suharto used a strategy to separate politics from religion. Related to Islam, he focused on diminishing the old-Masyumi's influence (Watson, 1994: 177). He applied several policies to Islam. First,

he stopped all of the debate regarding fundamental principles (Islam versus *Pancasila*) and forbade its consideration in the 1971 general election (Boland, 1971: 154; Watson, 1994: 100). After the first election, he ordered all parties compressed and merged into two parties and one government pseudo-party: *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (Indonesian Democracy Party), which accommodated all old nationalist parties and Christian parties; *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (The Union for Development Party), as a sole location for Islamic political aspiration; and *Golongan Karya*, the government's political vessel. Furthermore, in 1984 the government announced that *Pancasila* was to be the sole fundamental principle used in all Indonesian organizations (Watson, 1994: 182).

Next, the government issued policies clearly against an Islamic point of view: it prohibited the wearing of head-scarves by woman (*hijab*) in school and public office; it established a state-sponsored lottery; and it permitted mixed (religious) marriage (Watson, 1994: 193). Despite these adverse developments, the government opened up social opportunities for Muslims to gain more power. For example, it enacted creation of the Ministry of Religious Affair and the *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (Assembly of Indonesian Ulama) (Watson, 1994: 178-179). Demerath's analysis is noting that the correct when he said that the state tends to manage religious affairs in order to control them (Demerath, 2001: 87). Nonetheless, the effort of independent Muslims in the social and educational fields is still growing. As a result, many Islamic intellectuals rose to prominence in Indonesian society during the 1980's. In 1984 the NU declared a shift in focus from the political world to social development. Instead of seeking political power, it helped the growth of Islam in society at that time.

From the end of the 1980's into the beginning of the 1990's, an important change occurred. Suharto finally saw the importance of Islam in helping to maintain his power. This change is evident in several ways. First of all, some of the policies that repressed Islamic law were abolished, such as the prohibition against *hijab* and the state-sponsored lottery (Hefner, 1997). Secondly, Suharto went to Mecca to perform *hajj*, a very surprising act as he had always been known more as an adherent of Javanese traditional religion (Hefner, 1997: 75). Thirdly, the *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia* (The Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectual) intervened as an umbrella organization for intellectual Muslims. This came about despite the fact that some refused to join because the organization was considered too close to the New Order government (Hefner, 1997: 75).

The willingness of Suharto to embrace Islam as an ally can be seen also to signify the decreasing of his power.

4. *The Reformation Era*

Suharto tried to hold his power through Islamic factions, a strategy which enabled him to be re-elected in 1997 for the seventh time. However, he could not retain his position any longer, and was pressed to give up his post in May 1998. He declared that his resignation was due to the acute economic crisis, ongoing since 1997, and massive demonstrations by college students. Suharto's regime is well known for its violation of human rights and massive corruption (Demerath, 2001: 89). The presidential post was handed to his vice-president, Bachtar Jusuf Habibie, who once was the head of ICMI. This post-Suharto period is called the "Reformation Era". This era marked the awakening of Islamist voices in the political realm, as well as in society and the economy. A few important examples are cited here.

To begin with, after the fall of Suharto there were 42 Islamic parties, and some were able to participate in the first election of this era in 1999. Unfortunately, Islamic parties make up only 37,5 per cent of the votes (Effendy, 2003: 214). Nevertheless, Muslims experienced a new-democratic euphoria hardly felt before, and it was especially marked after the suppression of Islam during the New Order era (Effendy, 2003: 208). At this point some Islamic parties were not emphasizing the same goal as in the past, i.e., to insert Islam into the constitution and other fundamentals of the country. However, there were a few parties that still carried a similar agenda. Indeed, Islamic factions introduced the issue of Jakarta Charter's insertion into the constitution again (Effendy, 2003: 210; Indrayana, 2008: 317, 354-355). Once again, these factions had to face another failure regarding the Jakarta Charter issue. One factor in the failure was that *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (National Awakening Party), whose chairman, Kyai Abdurrahman Wahid,⁴ became a president after the election, took a stance on Nationalist ground rather than Islamist (Hanson, 2006: 249). However, the Muslim factions found another way to achieve their struggle to insert the Shari'a law onto society, i.e., through lesser-level government policies like local regulations (Bush, 2008: 174-176; Hasan, 2005: 315-315). The province of Aceh, as the only province in Indonesia that has special Islamic autonomy on Shari'a law, is a quite different story (Hanson, 2006: 250). In short, in the reformation era, Islamic parties gained momentum and successfully

integrated themselves into the Indonesian political realm, regardless of the fact that their agendas became different from the earlier Islamic faction.

On another level, the strengthening role of Islam is very clear in this era, within the sectors of the media, education, economy (like a Shari'a Bank), and others. Unfortunately, another notorious phenomenon arose in this period, the extremist groups. Their existence are evident in many events: suicidal bombings; religious conflicts in Ambon and Poso; attacks on and the closing of restaurants and other places that considered immoral from an Islamic perspective during Ramadhan; violence against the Ahmadiyah, the closing of and attack on many churches; repression of human rights and pluralist activists in 1998; and many more.⁵ As a result, there was increasing tension between religions in Indonesia. Those groups, including the most famous Islamic Front Defender, are not monolithic in their agenda and methods (Hasan, 2005: 305-308). Their only shared common concern may be the implementation of Shari'a in Indonesian society (Effendy, 2003: 217-222). Also, it is unclear whether they have any political interests or not. In short, the Reformation era, especially after the events of 9/11, has witnessed the rise of Islam in many ways. This occurred not only in the political realm. It included both extremist Muslims who carried out suicide bombings and were connected with international extremist organizations, and more "moderate" ones visibly attacking whatever they believe contravenes Islam (Hanson, 2005: 251). Glora Eliraz analyzed these Islamic extremist groups and their possible connections to Middle East extremist organizations and how their ideology is transmitted to Indonesia.⁶ Ironically, the clause to Islamize the constitution seems to have lost its importance in the new atmosphere of democracy, as we will see in the next section.

The Case of Jakarta's Governor and Vice Governor Election

Gradually, all Indonesian elections in the post-Suharto era have been transformed into not only a dramatic competition, but also a political drama with the use of communication media in all forms; television advertisements, pamphlets, to the most recent method, the internet. All the fuss about campaigns has caused a frantic atmosphere and created more abstainers who are apathetic about any politics. Major elections and presidential elections have become a show, a reality show to be precise, where, with or without the people's awareness, the masses are part of it. The Jakarta's governor

election, which has only twice been completed by direct voting (Schonhardt, 2012), is the first regional election that attracted nation-wide popularity, even international media. The reason for this attention is simply that Jakarta is an Indonesian capital which can be seen as a benchmark of the process of democracy in Indonesia. Also, Jakarta's governor election could have a greater and decisive impact for the next major battle of the parties and presidential candidates, which will be held in 2014 (Schonhardt, 2012). To put it another way, the Jakarta gubernatorial election has greater importance for various different political views and interests in the Indonesian political constellation. It is not only about Jakarta.

At the center of the "reality show" of Jakarta's election lie two pairs of governor-vice governor candidates: the incumbent governor Fauzi Bowo and his vice governor candidate Nachrowi Ramli (widely known as Foke and Nara, their popular nicknames), and the new challengers, Joko Widodo and Basuki Tjahja Purnama (Jokowi and Ahok). The result was clear that Jokowi-Ahok won the second election with approximately 54% of the vote, and would be inaugurated in the middle of October 2012 (*The Jakarta Post*, 2012a). Religion is used and intertwined in the political setting: in this case, it became even more complicated, since cultural and ethnic backgrounds also played an important role in the campaign. This included a smear campaign also, as usually happened in elections on all levels, from regional to national.

Fauzi Bowo, as an incumbent, had enjoyed all the privileges like massive financial backings, support from the major parties occupying the most seats in the parliament, public space usage to advertise his achievements, and so on. Moreover, Fauzi Bowo has been Jakarta's public officer for almost 30 years (Schonhardt, 2012b). Received his education from German, he was considered an expert on Jakarta in the era of development. Before his election as Governor in 2007, he was two times in a row a vice governor of Jakarta; even earlier, he served in an important government post for many years. Seen from one side, what he claimed in his campaign seemed to be true: that he is the man who is the most suited to be governor of Jakarta, due to his expertise. He also had accomplished several positive goals in public service, free public education for all until high school, and improvements in the health care system (Schonhardt, 2012a). However, he was blamed for several problems: the stagnancy and slow development of the city, for a great disparity in economic levels, for the high percentage of unemployment, for public transportation problems like worsened traffic and

a low level of public transportation, and for the classic problem of systemic corruption, which became more and more visible (Schonhardt, 2012b). Some people would say that he was part of the New Order system, after all. Nachrowi Ramli, his vice governor candidate, played only a minor role, since Fauzi Bowo held a more dominant position during the campaign. All the public knows about Mr. Ramli is that he served in the army and he is a native of a Jakarta tribes (*Betawi*), like Fauzi Bowo; the latter feature was, to some extent, very useful in attracting native voters.

As challengers, Jokowi and Ahok were barely known to the people. Thanks to the internet, however, both were successful in becoming popular because of their prolific individual records. Furthermore, after a sudden win in the first round election (Schonhardt, 2012b), their popularity increased even more through medias, and, ironically, some smear campaigns against them. The smear campaigns issue is treated in a latter part.

Joko Widodo was a Surakarta mayor when he decided to run for governor. He was achieved much in that role for seven years. At the second election in 2010, he was re-elected with more than 90% of the votes, sound proof of his capability (Schonhardt, 2012b). His well-known achievements included being on the list for World Mayor in 2012 (Schonhardt, 2012b), an international research organization. It was his method in using a sympathetic communication with many vendors to move them from the public park in order to revitalize the park for public use that brought him to the nomination (Schonhardt, 2012b). He also was known for his willingness to see real field problems, his humility in communicating directly with his constituents, and his clean record, free from the classic problems of Indonesian government; corruption, collusion, and nepotism (Schonhardt, 2012a). Coming from a merchant background (Schonhardt, 2012b), he even refused to take his salary as mayor. All of these attributes helped to build his charisma and popularity in Jakarta's governor election. However, there were three major reasons that possibly prevented him from winning the governor position. First of all, the scope of Surakarta, compared to Jakarta, is hugely different, both in numbers of population and in complexity of problems (Schonhardt, 2012a). Thus, his success in Surakarta did not mean he could repeat the same in Jakarta. The second reason related to Jokowi's ethnic background, Javanese. Unlike Fauzi Bowo and Nachrowi Ramli, who are natives of Jakarta or the Betawi tribe, Jokowi is not originally from Jakarta and could be considered an outsider. In some regions, the ethnic problem could decisively determine political achievement. Even though Jakarta is one of

the most plural societies in Indonesia, this factor still could be an obstacle. Third, Jokowi's partner, Ahok, had a background astonishingly unusual for a politician (Arditya, 2012b).

Basuki Tjahja Purnama, popularly known as Ahok, was serving as a member of the Indonesian House of Representatives on the national level when he joined Jokowi as his running mate in gubernatorial election. Before that, he had served as bupati (same level as mayor, but with a different area of jurisdiction from a city) in the Bangka-Belitung islands. To some extent, he is well known as a young generation politician who emphasizes political and financial transparency, anti-corruption, care for his constituents, and fairness. The last characteristic is very important, because of Ahok's double minorities background, Christian and Chinese-Indonesian (*Tiong Hoa*). There is always fear from the majority when a minority gains power that s/he will misuse that power to show favoritism to his or her own groups. Moreover, Chinese-Indonesians were suffered discrimination under Suharto's regime, until President Abdurrahman Wahid abrogated these discriminatory policies in 2001 (Jonathan, 2010). It is very rare to see a Chinese-Indonesian in government office, let alone at a leader-level like him. To some extent, he has characteristics similar to Jokowi's: young, energetic, clean record, clear vision, anti-corruption, care to the people, especially the poor, and having the people's trust. Besides his background acting as a major obstacle, minor voices have criticized him as unloyal to some political parties. Until now, Ahok has changed his allegiance to three different political parties. Ahok himself seemed to take this fact lightly and used to say that his primary coalition is with people, not a particular party. This coalition with people is also emphasized by Jokowi as well. However, Ahok's background has proven controversial in public discourse, as he is vulnerable to attack from both political opponents and the Islamist faction (Nurbianto, 2012). Despite Jokowi-Ahok's success in gaining the post in the second governor election, there were more hot issues about Ahok than Jokowi (Priyono and Birks).

Jokowi and Ahok were in the underdog position in the first round election. Supported by only two opposition parties, which held only around 11 representatives out of over 90 seats in the provincial parliament, they forged coalition with the people who admired them. It has been said that Jokowi-Ahok were like ants who fight against an elephant (Schonhardt, 2012b). From any point of view, indeed, their winning is phenomenal, and unexpected at the beginning. They won the first election with 43% of the voters, while Fauzi Bowo and Nachrowi Ramli got 34%; the other candidates

from the Prosperous and Justice Party (an Islamic faction) got 11%, and the last three (two pairs were independent) divided the rest of the percentage (Nurbianto, 2012). This result was a contrast to the surveys conducted by a private company but hired by Fauzi Bowo, before the first election day. Those surveys placed Fauzi Bowo-Nachrowi Ramli as winners with more than 50% of the vote, so there would be no need for a second round election. Indeed, one of the slogans of Fauzi Bowo's campaign was "Cukup Satu Putaran!" (One round is enough). Personally speaking, I also got the impression that Fauzi Bowo would win since I saw his massive publicity in newspapers, pamphlets, banners, stickers, TV advertisements, and many more locations: these reflected his greater financial capability. On the contrary, I only found very little evidence of Jokowi-Ahok's public campaign. From my observation in the past, the one who spends more money in media is more likely to win. It has to do with the fact that the majority of people are uneducated and more attracted to something visible: money, TV, banners, and so on. However, Jokowi-Ahok unexpectedly won the first election in August with a significant number of voters. Some experts said that the victory of Jokowi-Ahok was enabled by the abstainers, who then were eager to vote, and the swing voters. *The Economist* described the victory of Jokowi-Ahok as resonant with the emerging figures in similar Asian countries, those challenging the traditional elites; in Jakarta's case, that elite was led by Fauzi Bowo whom major parties backed (*The Economist*, 2012a: 47; Schonhardt, 2012b).

Before the first round election, I almost never heard of any religious or ethnic issues. But, soon after Jokowi-Ahok won the first election, some issues related to religion and ethnicity appeared. Between the two factors, religion seemed to be more explicit while ethnic issues appeared only implicitly. One example that I found was a short message service (SMS) circulating among my friends that Ahok, if he got elected with Jokowi, would try to assassinate Jokowi and take his position as governor, so the Chinese would triumph over others. The background to these rumors is the 1998 tragedy, when many Chinese-Indonesian were killed, raped, and plundered in massive riots. The fear was that this violence would re-occur if they dared to support Ahok (Arditya and Aritonang, 2012). But all of these were not visible public issues, compared to the religious issue.

In the religious area, one major issue involved a famous Dangdut singer and Islamic preacher, Rhoma Irama. Rhoma Irama has been popularly known for his music career, for many years; his songs addressed social problems of the society and called people back to Islamic values, such as

prohibitions against gambling, drinking, and using drugs. He was caught on video preaching in one mosque, openly saying that for Muslims it is *haram* (prohibited by religion) to vote for non-Muslim as a leader (Nurbianto, 2012).⁷ Although he did not mention a name, he was obviously pointing to Ahok as the sole Christian candidate. Rhoma Irama also falsely accused Jokowi's mother of being Christian. He apologized later for this and was pardoned by Jokowi's mother (Nurbianto, 2012; *The Jakarta Post*, 2012c). Because of his preaching, Rhoma Irama was reported to the Election Watch Committee for a covert campaign and a smear campaign against one candidate, but since he was not listed on Fauzi Bowo's promotion team, he was found not guilty (Nurbianto, 2012; Arditya, 2012a). Rhoma himself insists that he respected all candidates, regardless of their ethnic and religious backgrounds, but he asserted that he has an obligation to discuss Islamic concepts of leadership.

After Jokowi and Ahok were elected as Governor and Deputy Governor of Jakarta, the show continued. Before the inauguration, some Muslim groups objected to the fact that Ahok, as Deputy Governor, would be the head of several government Islamic offices (*The Jakarta Post*, 2012b). Also, in Surakarta there were objections because Jokowi would be leaving his post as mayor in the middle of his term, so his deputy mayor, a Catholic politician, would replace him. Some Muslims considered having a Catholic as a leader to be against Islamic law (*The Globe Journal*, 2012). The phenomenon of "kafirization" (literally *kafir* means "unbeliever" of "infidel") occurred not only in Jakarta, but also in several other place (Priyono and Birks, 2012). This trend caused a tension between religion and politics, which then intertwined with other factors. Indeed, this complex of influences is not over yet and will continue as a hot issue in the Indonesian political setting.

Analysis of the Relationship between Islam and the State in Indonesian Politics

There are several points to emphasize. To begin with, it is important to underline the fact that Indonesia is not an Islamic country, in the sense that the fundamental of the state is Islam. It is also clear that Indonesia is not a secular country that strictly separates state and religion. Indonesia's most fundamental principle is *Pancasila*. It is true that in the Reformation

era, *Pancasila* is not enjoying the same sacred position as before. Moreover, the failure of New Order governments for many years in addressing welfare issues has provoked some people to distrust Pancasila and the democracy system. But, Pancasila is still the most fundamental principle, at least for now. In my opinion, in a truly democratic realm like the one it has now, *Pancasila* and other ideologies, including Islam, become one voice among many which must compete to attract people through their value and utility. This landscape can be compared to a free market-economy where all products flow freely to attract consumers. The phenomenon of Islam's growing presence in the Reformation era should be viewed from this perspective.

Secondly, the political agenda to place Islam in the formal-legal state constitution at the national level will never succeed in the history of Indonesia. Instead, this agenda was suppressed throughout the reign of Sukarno's guided democracy and Suharto's authoritarian regime. However, instead of dying, Islam then grew as a social-religious power throughout all levels of Indonesian society, because of their efforts in those fields over many years. Islam no longer carries a stereotype of backwardness as it did in the New Order era. The growing influence of Islam in the Reformation era is a result of all these efforts. Furthermore, it has also helped to create a model of Islam that is very distinct from its profile in other places, including the model of relations between religion and state. The fact that Islamic political parties have been frequently declined throughout some elections since the beginning of the Reformation era until now is the proof. One Islamist party that still retains voters is a Justice and Prosperous Party that pursues the anti-corruption and clean governance issue, rather than focusing on changing the constitution according to Islamic ideas. This also shows that the people, who are in the majority Muslim are more concerned with issues of welfare and clean governance, than with the issue of Islamic legal influenced. Jokowi and Ahok could win without any protest after the election because of this very same logic. However, in a few various local regions, the Shari'a issues did offer a successful route for Islamists to qualify their agendas.

Thirdly, the power of extremist Muslims soon after Suharto's fall was a consequence of freedom of speech: in Suharto's time, every different voice was oppressed by the military. Indeed, the extremist existence has created many horizontal problems, especially when they violate others' rights. Thus, there is a problem with the weakness of the state in upholding the law and protecting their people. Moreover, the phenomenon of Islamic extremist groups cannot be separated from socio-economic problems, nor from systemic

corruption in government. Other analysts even point to the government as the brain behind those extremist groups, using those groups for their interests. While their existence is apparent, actually their voices remain minor. They receive the most attention from the media. Thus, those groups' loud voices do not always resemble the wider Muslim audience. The efficacy of Jokowi-Ahok's campaign is just the most recent example of that fact.

The fourth and last point related to religion, namely Ahok's status as a non-Muslim in the past election. It is surely a controversial issue, especially for those who hold a strict Islamic position on Shari'a. But, as been stated earlier, in a democratic system each opposing voice is just one among many. Thus, the Islamist voices are as valid as others. They may try as hard as possible (and even use suspect methods) to persuade people to join their cause, but whatever the outcome, they must respect it. This process can be compared with the recent US presidential election, in which religion played a major part as well. When Obama won, certain Christians felt that their Christian values were lost too, because of regulations favorable to homosexual marriage succeeded. But there is nothing the losing side can do until the next election, perhaps unless, perhaps, they revise their approaches and agenda. These are the consequences of a democratic system.

Conclusion

The relationship between Islam and the state in Indonesia has been complex, from independence until today. Demerath's analogy of the moth circling a flame truly comprehends those complexities (Demerath, 2001: 1). *Pancasila* was invented in order to stabilize the relation between the religions and the state. It has proven which to be very effective, albeit that in the Reformation era Islamic groups tended to pull the string to the religion of Islam. However, the maneuvering of Islamic groups was not a total fiasco, since Islam has now permeated all levels of the society, including politics. This development created dialectic between Islam and the state to find equilibrium.

Even before the state had born, Sukarno has predicted that when Indonesia chose democracy as its system, then Islam would be only one voice among many, even though despite the majority of the whole population would be Muslim. Thus, he expected fair-play among all ideologies, whether religious, secular, or other. Sukarno's prediction seems valid even today.

LITERATURE

- Arditya, Andreas D. 2012a. "Rhoma Cleared of Campaign Violations". *The Jakarta Post*. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/08/13/rhoma-cleared-campaign-violations.html>. Accessed November 12, 2012.
- _____. 2012b. "Rhoma Faces Probe Over Ahok 'Slurs'". *The Jakarta Post*. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/08/03/rhoma-faces-probe-over-ahok-slurs.html>. Accessed November 12, 2012.
- Arditya, Andreas D. and Aritonang, Margareth S. 2012. "Campaigns Get Nastier in Gubernatorial Poll". *The Jakarta Post*. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/08/25/campaigns-get-nastier-gubernatorial-poll.html>. Accessed November 12, 2012.
- Azra, Azyumardi. 2006. "Pluralism, Coexistence, and Religious Harmony in Southeast Asia: Indonesian Experience in the 'Middle Path'". In *Contemporary Islam: Dynamic, not Static*. Abdul Aziz Said, Mohammed Abu-Nimer, and Meena Sharify-Funk (eds.). New York, NY: Routledge.
- Benda, Harry Jindrich. 1958. *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945*. The Hague: W. van Hoeve.
- Boland, B.J. 1971. *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*. The Hague: Nijhoff.
- Bush, Robin. 2008. "Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?". In *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*. Greg Fealy and Sally White (eds.), 174-191. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Cribb, Robert. 1991. Introduction to *Islam and the Pancasila*. Margaret Bocquet-Siek and Robert Cribb (eds.), i-iv. Townsville, Queensland: James Cook University, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies.
- Demerath, N.J. 2001. *Crossing the Gods: World Religions and Worldly Politics*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.
- Effendy, Bahtiar. 2003. *Islam and the State in Indonesia*. Athens: Ohio University Press.
- Eliraz, Giora. 2004. *Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism, and the Middle East Dimension*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.

- Hanson, Eric O. 2006. *Religion and Politics in the International System Today*. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.
- Hasan, Noorhaidi. 2005. "September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia". In *Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social, and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century*. K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (eds.), 301-324. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Hefner, Robert W. 1997. "Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia". In *Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia*. Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatic (eds.), 75-128. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Indrayana, Denny. 2008. *Indonesian Constitutional Reform, 1999-2002: An Evaluation of Constitution-Making in Transition*. Jakarta: Kompas Book Pub.
- Jonathan, Titus. 2010. "Letters: Honoring Gus Dur's memory". Opinion in *The Jakarta Post*. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/01/06/letters-honoring-gus-dur%E2%80%99s-memory.html>. Accessed November 12, 2012.
- Laffan, Michael Francis. 2011. *The Makings of Indonesian Islam: Orientalism and the Narration of a Sufi Past*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Nurbianto, Bambang. 2012. "Election Runoff: Will Conservative Voters Help Fauzi?". *The Jakarta Post*. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/09/19/election-runoff-will-conservative-voters-help-fauzi.html>. Accessed November 12, 2012.
- Priyono, A.E. and Birks, Teresa. 2012. "'Anti-kafir' Politics in Local Elections: Jakarta and Medan Cases". *The Jakarta Post*. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/09/18/anti-kafir-politics-local-elections-jakarta-and-medan-cases.html>. Accessed November 12, 2012.
- Schonhardt, Sara. 2012a. "Challenger Appears to Have Edge in Jakarta Governor's Race". *The New York Times*. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/world/asia/21iht-jakarta21.html?_r=0. Accessed November 12, 2012.
- _____. 2012b. "Outsider Breathing New Ideas Into Jakarta Election." *The New York Times*. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/world/asia/20iht-jakarta20.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. Accessed November 12, 2012.

- Schumann, Olaf. 1995. "Christian-Muslim Encounter in Indonesia". In *Christian-Muslim Encounters*. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Wadi Zaidan Haddad (eds.), 285-299. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- The Economist*, 2012a. "Fighting Monsters: Political Outsiders are Challenging Asia's Traditional Elites". September 29th.
- _____. 2012b. "Going Underground: The Government Looks to have been too Lax over Radical Islamist Groups". <http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21565688-government-looks-have-been-too-lax-over-radical-islamist-groups-going-underground>. Accessed November 13, 2012.
- The Globe Journal*. 2012. "Beralasan Non-muslim, FPI Tolak F.X. Rudi Gantikan Jokowi di Solo" (Islamic Defender Front Rejects FX Rudi in Replacing Jokowi in Solo because He is a non-Muslim). <http://www.theglobejournal.com/Cities/beralasan-non-muslim-fpi-tolak-fx-rudi-gantikan-jokowi-di-solo/index.php>. Accessed November 12, 2012.
- The Jakarta Post*. 2012a. "It's Official: Jokowi Wins". <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/09/28/it-s-official-jokowi-wins.html>. Accessed November 12, 2012.
- _____. 2012b. "FPI Rejects Vice Governor-elect to Lead Islamic Bodies". <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/10/09/fpi-rejects-vice-governor-elect-lead-islamic-bodies.html>. Accessed November 12, 2012.
- _____. 2012c. "Guess What?: Jokowi's Mother Forgives Rhoma". <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/08/09/guess-what-jokowi-s-mother-forgives-rhoma.html>. Accessed November 12, 2012.
- Von der Mehden, Fred R. 1995. "Indonesia". In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. Volume 2. John L. Esposito (ed.), 196-203. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Watson, C.W. 1994. "Muslims and the State in Indonesia". In *Islams, Muslims and the Modern State: Case Studies of Muslims in Thirteen Countries*. Hussin Mutalib and Taj ul-Islam Hashmi (eds.), 174-196. New York: St. Martin Press.

Catatan Akhir

¹ For more sophisticated information in regards to this topic see (Laffan, 2001).

² To see a rigorous picture about Islam in Japanese period see (Benda, 1958).

³ Pancasila includes five principles. These principles are belief in one God, national unity, guided democracy, social justice, and humanitarianism (Demerath, 2001: 86).

⁴ Kyai is an honorable title for ulama or Islamic leader in society. Wahid in particular was famous ulama who well known for both traditional Islamic heritage and pluralist approach, even since Suharto's time.

⁵ The most recent example of the existence of the underground extremist group is the capture of eleven people who already planned to bomb American embassy and consulate (*The Economist*, 2012b).

⁶ See chapter 2 (Eliraz, 2004: 26-66).

⁷ See also Rhoma Irama's speech at Youtube's video (<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KiYEc2z30mo>).